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INTRODUCTION 
Iraq has drawn the attention of the world since the first Gulf War 
in 1991. Since the 2003 invasion, the international community has 
devoted a tremendous amount of effort and resources to Iraq’s 
reconstruction. With the primary emphasis on security and rebuilding 
infrastructure, the challenges have been formidable and well 
documented. However, many have ignored another threat, one that 
will become increasingly important in the years ahead. Iraq heavily 
depends on the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris, the source of which 
comes primarily from outside its own borders. Without a plan to 
preserve the long term “strategic” water for Iraq, and prompt action, 
any gains in the security or economic sphere in Iraq may be lost. 
 
 * The author holds a B.A. and J.D. from Marquette University, and an LL.M. 
in Land Use Management and Control from George Washington University with 
Highest Honors. He served in the United States Marine Corps as a Judge Advocate 
for twenty-seven years, and is currently a Senior Lecturer for the Jackson School 
of International Studies at the University of Washington in Seattle and a Senior 
Peace Fellow with the Public International Law and Policy Group. 
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Unique geography and its access to water have shaped the history 
of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. The “Rivers of Eden” find their source 
in modern-day Turkey, in the central highlands where rain and snow 
are plentiful. The Euphrates flows through Syria and Iraq to the head 
of the Persian Gulf, where it joins the Tigris at the Shat-Al-Arab. The 
Tigris flows directly from Turkey to Iraq, where it obtains additional 
flows from the Zagros Mountains in Iran. 
Turkey has been blessed with an environment that can optimally 
utilize the waters of the “Two Rivers” of the Euphrates-Tigris. Deep 
valleys, cooler temperatures and fertile soil provide good conditions 
for catchment, water diversions and agriculture. This is not true for 
the neighbors to the south, both Syria and Iraq, where desert 
conditions and high evaporation rates prevail. Population growth and 
increasing demands from agriculture will seriously affect the supply, 
both in quantity and quality, in the years ahead. 
As the population in Turkey, Syria and Iraq expands, potential 
water deficiencies have become a major concern. The Two Rivers 
provide a substantial amount of the fresh water for all three 
countries, although Syria’s reliance on the Euphrates is noteworthy. 
In a study completed in 2001, the World Bank Environmental 
Department predicted the amount of fresh water available per capita 
for “water stressed” countries in the region in 2025.1 For Iraq the 
1990 figures were 5,285 cubic meters per capita per year (“CMY”) 
but the 2025 figures are projected to be 2000 CMY.2 For Syria the 
1990 numbers were 439 CMY but they will be reduced to 161 CMY 
by 2025.3 
Of the Two Rivers, the Euphrates requires particular attention. 
While approximately fifty percent of the water in the Tigris 
originates outside Iraq, “more than [ninety percent] of [the 
 
 1. RAFIK HIRJI & HANS OLAV IBREKK, ENVIRONMENTAL AND WATER 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 8 (World Bank Env’t Dep’t, 2001), available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/20 
02/05/20/000094946_0205040403116/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (noting that 
water stressed areas often have a heightened threat of conflict in times of drought). 
 2. Rafik Hirji & Hans Olav Ibrekk, Water Resources Data: Water Stressed 
and Water Scarce Countries: 2025 Projections, http://www.waterinfo.gr/pages/ 
data.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Hirij & Ibrekk, 2025 Projections]. 
 3. Id. 
49528CC6-54A9-288191.DOC 12/24/2008  11:26 AM 
2008] STRATEGIC WATER FOR IRAQ  277 
Euphrates] water comes from outside the country.”4 An agreement 
reached between Syria and Iraq in April 1990, granted to Iraq fifty-
eight percent of the water received by Syria from Turkey.5 In May 
2004, the Iraqi Minister of Water Resources stated that Iraq 
historically used nearly thirty billion cubic meters (BCM) per year 
from the Two Rivers but now uses about a third of that amount.6 
Predictions always entail some degree of guesswork, but the 
evidence is clear that water demand in the region in the next ten to 
twenty years will exceed supply. 
When rivers cross international boundaries the most difficult 
questions arise: Who is entitled to the water, and how can 
downstream countries be protected? Turkey is clearly in the strongest 
position in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, geographically, politically 
and militarily. But this is a volatile region where international 
relations are driven by numerous factors, including oil, politics, 
extremism, economics, and outside intervention. 
I. WATER WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST? 
The question of water and conflict is receiving increased attention 
from scholars and policy makers. There is a long history of water 
playing a role in conflict; Peter Gleick of the Pacific Institute has 
attempted to provide a comprehensive chronology.7 Gleick regularly 
 
 4. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, AQUASTAT – 
FAO’s Information System on Water and Agriculture: Iraq, http://www.fao.org/nr/ 
water/aquastat/countries/iraq/index.stm (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter 
2008 FAO Report] (comparing the relative significance of the two rivers to Iraq’s 
access to and control over international watercourses). 
 5. See Eyal Benvenisti, Water Conflicts during the Occupation of Iraq, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 860, 867 (2003) (relating the fact that this is less than one-third the 
amount of water Iraq previously received from the Euphrates river). 
 6. See Dale Gavlak, Iraq Seeks to Ease Water Shortage, BBC NEWS, May 31, 
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3764905.stm (explaining the view of 
Iraq’s Minister for Water Resources, that the water shortage is caused by a lack of 
information-sharing and cooperation between countries, as well as poor 
infrastructure). 
 7. See generally PETER H. GLEICK, WATER CONFLICT CHRONOLOGY (Pacific 
Institute, 2008), http://worldwater.org/conflictchronology.pdf (dividing the world’s 
water conflicts into six types, including conflicts over control of water resources, 
conflicts treating water as a military tool, conflicts treating water as a political tool, 
conflicts targeting water sources as tools of terrorism, conflicts that feature water 
systems as targets of military actions by the nation or state, and conflicts where 
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updates the chronology, and the most recent events are generally 
attributed to terrorism, including the 2003 bombing of a water supply 
pipeline in Iraq. Although water has rarely been the primary factor in 
war, there is an emerging consensus that the likelihood of conflict 
over water will increase in the next fifteen years “as countries press 
against the limits of available water.”8 In a 2001 speech, the 
Chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council warned: 
By 2015 nearly half the world’s population—more than 3 
billion people—will live in countries that are “water-
stressed”—having less than 1,700 cubic meters of water per 
capita per year—mostly in Africa, the Middle East, South 
Asia, and northern China . . . . Water shortages occurring in 
combination with other sources of tension—such as in the 
Middle East—will be the most worrisome.9 
Professor Tony Allen of the University of London, School of 
Oriental and African Studies notes that “the Middle East as a region 
ran out of water in the 1970’s.”10 Professor Allen has theorized that 
the shortage has been made up by importing food, and the water is 
now “virtual” and contained or imbedded in the imported 
commodities.11 As an example, one kilogram of wheat requires 1000 
 
water systems play a significant role in development disputes). 
 8. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2015: A DIALOGUE 
ABOUT THE FUTURE WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS 27 (2000), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf (noting that 
historically water shortages have a tendency to increase cooperation, but as water 
becomes more scarce and populations increase, the likelihood of conflict over 
water also increases). 
 9. John C. Gannon, Chairman, Nat’l Intelligence Council, Remarks at a 
Conference Sponsored by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: The Role of Intelligence 
Services in a Globalized World (May 21, 2001), available at http://www.dni.gov/ 
nic/speeches_globalizedworld.html (emphasizing the vulnerability of the Middle 
East to more serious water conflicts due to the already-high political tensions in 
that region). 
 10. J. ANTHONY ALLAN, THE MIDDLE EAST WATER QUESTION: 
HYDROPOLITICS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5 (2002) [hereinafter ALLAN, THE 
MIDDLE EAST]. 
 11. J. Anthony Allan, Water Stress and Global Mitigation: Water, Food, and 
Trade, ARID LANDS NEWSL., Spring/Summer 1999 (Office of Arid Land Studies, 
Univ. of Ariz., Tucson, Ariz.), available at http://cals.arizona.edu/OALS/ALN/ 
aln45/allan.html (offering one theory on how the Middle Eastern economic 
systems compensate for water scarcity in the region). 
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liters of water to produce.12 A nation that is water-scarce can make 
up for the shortage by importing food. But this is not a solution for 
countries that do not have the economic resources, and in matters of 
food security a nation will prefer not to rely on the good will of 
neighboring states to make the food available. 
There have been dire predictions of water wars for years. In 1988, 
author R.Z. Chesnoff posited the following hypothetical scenario: 
“Nov. 12, 1993. War erupted throughout the Middle East today in a 
desperate struggle for dwindling water supplies. Iraqi forces, 
attempting to smash a Syrian blockade, launched massive attacks on 
the Euphrates River valley. Syria answered with missile attacks on 
Baghdad.”13 Long after his prediction, the scenario depicted by Mr. 
Chesnoff has not yet occurred. The “water pessimists” have been 
consistently proven wrong, but their alarm is not misplaced.14 
Although there may not be a clear and present danger of a water war 
between Turkey, Syria, or Iraq, the next twenty years are likely to 
see more political instability and declining public health in the 
region. A water crisis is likely, but may not occur as a classic 
shooting war. Some analysts believe the problem is not water stress 
per se (as with conditions within individual countries) but rather the 
unilateral attempts to develop an international river without an 
agreement between neighbors.15 Further, there seems to be new 
consensus that water will become an increasingly volatile strategic 
issue in the next ten to twenty years.16 Combined with a global food 
 
 12. World Water Council, Virtual Water, http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/ 
index.php?id=866 (last visited Sept. 26, 2008) (illustrating how a country can 
reduce domestic water use by importing foods that require a large amount of water 
to grow). 
 13. Richard Z. Chesnoff, When Water Feeds Flames, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Nov. 21, 1988, at 47 (imagining violence between Iraq and Syria as they 
fight for control over the water of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers). 
 14. ALLAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 10, at 3 (arguing that into the future, 
the countries in the region of the Middle East and North Africa will encounter the 
greatest difficulty in ensuring freshwater supply sufficiently satisfies the needs of 
their growing populations). 
 15. Sandra L. Postel & Aaron T. Wolf, Dehydrating Conflict, FOREIGN POL’Y, 
Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 60, 63 (stating that “[W]ater disputes between countries, though 
typically not leading to war directly, have fueled decades of regional tensions, 
thwarted economic development, and risked provoking larger conflicts before 
eventually giving way to cooperation.”). 
 16. Jason J. Morrissette & Douglas A. Borer, Where Oil and Water Do Mix: 
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crisis that has already taken its toll in 2008, there is real cause for 
alarm.17 
Since 2003 and the invasion of Iraq, the strategic landscape in the 
region of the Tigris-Euphrates has changed dramatically and is still 
unstable. Without increased international attention, the situation will 
undermine other factors that might otherwise favor regional 
stability.18 This means that even if the optimists are right, and Iraq 
eventually emerges as a stable and peaceful country, all gains can be 
lost if a water crisis envelops the area. Even though the situation in 
Iraq remains unsettled, the long-term consequences of a water crisis 
in the next ten to twenty years cannot be ignored. 
II. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 
Prior to World War I, international law with respect to rivers 
primarily served to resolve disputes concerning freedom of 
navigation.19 Since that time, increasing polulation and dwindling 
water supplies have led policy-makers to attempts to provide general 
guidelines applicable to the world’s watersheds. The concept of a 
“drainage basin,” for example, was accepted by the International 
Law Association in the Helsinki Rules of 1966, it also provided 
guidelines for the reasonable and equitable sharing of a common 
 
Environmental Scarcity and Future Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa, 
PARAMETERS, Winter 2004-2005, at 86, 87 (noting that trends towards elites 
holding ownership of scarce natural resources and the associated violent conflicts 
are likely to continue and worsen without peace agreements and an increased 
reliance on virtual water, the water conserved by importing food). 
 17. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola, The New Economics of Hunger, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 27, 2008, at A1 (highlighting the outbreaks of violence in numerous countries 
as a direct result of the global food crisis and rising food prices). 
 18. HENRI J. BARKEY, TURKEY AND IRAQ: THE PERILS (AND PROSPECTS) OF 
PROXIMITY 19 (U.S. Inst. for Peace, 2005) available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/ 
specialreports/sr141.pdf (noting the many setbacks Iraq has suffered since the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and highlighting the impediment to dialogue 
between Turkey and Iraq that the invasion has caused). 
 19. FREDERICK M. LORENZ & EDWARD J. ERICKSON, THE EUPHRATES 
TRIANGLE 30 (1999) (outlining the history of international water law); see also 
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. 
BOURNE 30-31 (Patricia Wouters ed., Kluwer Law Int’l Ltd. 1997) (explaining that 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, international water law served to 
ensure freedom of navigation). 
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waterway.20 Under Article IV of the Helsinki Rules, “[e]ach basin 
State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable 
share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage 
basin.”21 
Developing broad concepts that apply to all watersheds has been 
challenging from the start. Even the term “international drainage 
basin” has proven to be controversial in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 
and Turkey has consistently maintained that the two rivers form a 
single basin.22 This argument can lead to both practical and political 
benefits for Turkey. If Iraq should claim a water shortage in the flow 
of the Euphrates, Turkey can argue any defecit be made up from the 
excess flow of the Tigris inside Iraq. And Turkey can point to the 
fact that Iraq has already created a canal to do just that, strengthening 
its argument on the “one basin” theory.23 
Applying general legal guidelines to particular rivers is a daunting 
task. Article V of the Helsinki Rules lists eleven factors to consider 
in defining reasonable and equitable use of water.24 “There is no 
hierarchy provided for these components; they are instead to be 
considered as a whole. One important shift in legal thinking in the 
Helsinki Rules is the right to beneficial use of water, rather than to 
water per se. But this change has not made the rules any easier to 
 
 20. International Law Association, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of 
International Rivers, 52 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 484 (1966) [hereinafter 
Helsinki Rules] (outlining the duties and obligations of States using and sharing 
international drainage basins, including both surface and underground waters). 
 21. Id. art. 4 (stating, with further explanation in art. 5, that States determine 
the definition of a reasonable and equitable share in the light of all relevant 
factors). 
 22. AYSEGUL KIBAROGLU, BUILDING A REGIME FOR THE WATERS OF THE 
EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVER BASIN 241 (Kluwer Law International, Ltd. 2002) 
 23. Id. at 241-42 (describing the Thartar Canal in Iraq and surplus water in the 
Tigris River). 
 24. Helsinki Rules, arts. 4, 5, supra note 20 (listing the factors that States must 
consider, including but not limited to: the geography of the basin, the hydrology of 
the basin, the climate affecting the basin, the past utilization of waters of the basin, 
the economic and social needs of each basin State, the population dependent on the 
waters of the basin in each basin State, the comparative costs of alternative means 
of satisfying the economic and social needs of each basin State, the availability of 
other resources, the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of 
the basin, the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States 
as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses, and the degree to which of a basin 
State may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State). 
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apply, and the Helsinki Rules have rarely been used to help define 
water use. The Mekong Committee used the Helsinki Rules 
definition of ‘reasonable and equitable use’ in formulation of their 
Declaration of Principles in 1975, although no specific allocations 
were determined.”25 Although they were rarely applied, in the 
absence of any other framework for resolving international water 
disputes most States considered them to be valid as customary 
international law.26 
During the United Nations’ review of the Helisinki Rules, some 
states (notably Brazil, Belgium, China, and France) viewed the 
drainage basin approach as contravening national soveriegnty, and 
objected to its prominence.27 “Others, notably Finland and the 
Netherlands, argued that a watershed was the most rational and 
scientific unit to be managed. Still others argued that, given the 
complexity and uniqueness of each watershed, general codification 
should not even be attempted.”28 States were of course determined to 
promote their own national interest and each brought a unique 
history and experience in disputes over water. Some States were 
heavily reliant on water from outside their own borders, and others, 
such as China, Canada and Turkey, were more concerned with 
sovereignty over water inside the country. On December 8, 1970, the 
U.N. General Assembly directed its own legal advisory body, the 
International Law Commission to prepare a draft Codification of the 
Law on Water Courses for Purposes other than Navigation.29 
 
 25. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30. See also Aaron T. Wolf, 
Criteria for Equitable allocations: The Heart of International Water Conflict, NAT. 
RESOURCES F., Feb. 1999, at 3-4 (noting that although States have only used the 
guidelines once, several States have questioned the potentially under inclusive 
process used in drafting the Helsinki Rules). 
 26. See Salman A. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law, 23 
INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 630 (2007) (discussing the history and 
development of the Helsinki Rules). 
 27. Other Legal Questions: Progressive Development and Codification of the 
Rules of International Law Relating to International Watercourses, 1970 U.N.Y.B. 
817, 819, U.N. Sales No. E.72.I.1 [hereinafter Other Legal Questions] (noting the 
vote of Brazil against the resolution and reporting the objections of China and 
other countries to various parts of the resolution). 
 28. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30; see also Other Legal Questions, 
supra note 27 at 817. 
 29. Id. at 818. 
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Despite an additional call for codification at the U.N. Water 
Conference at Mar de Plata in 1977, the International Law 
Commission took twenty-one years to complete its Draft Articles. 
Political and hydrological problems slowed the process. As an 
example, “in response to a 1974 questionnaire submitted to member 
states, about half the respondents supported the concept of a drainage 
basin (e.g. Argentina, Finland and the Netherlands), while half were 
strongly negative (e.g. Austria, Brazil, and Spain) or ambivalent.”30 
Some viewed the recognition of a “Watercourse system” as a basin 
to threaten national sovereignty.31 Again, each State was motivated to 
protect its own special concerns and unique geographical setting. 
Downstream and upstream States are inherently skeptical of the 
actions of the other. 
More than two decades after receiving its direction from the 
General Assembly, the International Law Commission adopted 
thirty-two draft principles in 1994. Three years later, the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted the draft principles as “The Convention 
on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
[“Framework Convention”].32 The Convention provided that thirty-
five States had to ratify before it would become effective. 
Similarly to the Helsinki Rules, the Framework Convention 
generally requires communication and cooperation among riparian 
states along an international watercourse.33 Further, the Convention 
strives to promote the exchange of data and information and 
notification of possible adverse effects among states sharing a 
watercourse. Further, states should aim to protect eco-systems, and 
the Convention provides for emergency situations. “Allocations are 
dealt with through equally vague language. ‘Equitable and 
reasonable use’ within each watercourse state, ‘with a view to 
attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits 
 
 30. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of International 
Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, at 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (July 8, 1997) 
[hereinafter Convention] (including sections on cooperation and the sharing of 
information among parties to the treaty). 
 33. See, e.g., Stephen C. McCaffrey & Mpazi Sinjela, Current Development: 
The 1997 United Nations Convention on International Watercourses, 92 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 97 (1998) (providing an overview of the Convention and its negotiation). 
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therefrom,’ (Article 5) is balanced with an obligation not to cause 
‘significant harm’ (Article 7).”34 The latter provision is always of 
greatest concern to the upstream riparian, and it is easy to 
contemplate a situation where an upstream country would be ordered 
by an international court to release more water if Article 7 had been 
violated. 
One of the major difficulties in managing transboundary water is 
that much of it is moving underground and is therefore much more 
difficult to measure and regulate. The term “watercourse” in the 
Framework Convention can include both surface and groundwater, 
and is based largely on the terms of the Helsinki Rules, but it 
includes only groundwater that is connected to the surface water.35 It 
does not incorporate a broader definition of groundwater contained 
in what is now known as the Seoul Rules, which includes 
transboundary aquifers that are not connected to surface waters of an 
international drainage basin.36 
Existing law for transboundary water has proven easy to argue but 
very difficult to apply. For example, in many areas of the world with 
frequently changing political boundaries, riparian positions and legal 
rights may shift just as quickly. The Framework Convention sets up 
“a balancing test more appropriate for the courtroom than the 
politically-charged atmosphere of international water disputes. A 
balancing test requires some third party, such as an arbitrator, 
watermaster, or court, to resolve the issues. In water basins without 
such a regime, balancing tests are not particularly useful.”37 
The uncertainty in international water law is compounded by the 
fact that cases are generally heard by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) only with the consent of the parties involved, and no 
practical enforcement mechanism is available.38 These considerations 
 
 34. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30; Convention, supra note 32, at 
4-5 (showing both the obligation to make reasonable use of the waters and to avoid 
causing significant harm to other watercourse States). 
 35. See Convention, supra note 32. 
 36. See Salman, supra note 26, at 630 (describing the efforts of the 
International Law Commission in Seoul in 1986 to clarify certain provisions of the 
Helsinki Rules). 
 37. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30-31. 
 38. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1042 , T.S. 993 
(1945). 
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have limited the ICJ to just a single case concerning the law of 
transboundary rivers.39 In the one case heard by the ICJ the results 
were mixed, and although the case may have clarified some of the 
general principles of equitable utilization it failed to resolve the 
dispute between the riparian countries.40 This reveals the 
fundamental problem in transboundary water law, complex standards 
to be decided by a judge using a “balancing of interests” are of 
limited value on the international stage. 
International law plays only a minor role in the Euphrates-Tigris 
Basin, as the Framework Convention is not yet in force, and Turkey 
refuses to become a party.41 All the parties have legal arguments, but 
they have more political value than practical effect. Turkey has 
consistently opposed efforts to “internationalize” the matter, relying 
on the same legal doctrines that the U.S. once used in disputes with 
Mexico concerning the Colorado River.42 At the time of this writing 
only sixteen states had ratified the Framework Convention, and that 
number includes both Syria and Iraq.43 
 In regions such as North America, with plentiful water resources 
and good international relations, the record of cooperation is 
excellent. But Middle Eastern river basins face pressures from 
 
 39. Aaron T. Wolf, Shared Waters: Conflict and Cooperation, 32 ANN. REV. 
ENV’T & RESOURCES 3.1, 3.18-3.19 (2007) (noting that, in its fifty-five-year 
history, the International Court of Justice has only heard one case pertaining to 
international waters). 
 40. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 7). 
 41. See Murat Metin Hakki, Borders and Boundaries in International Law: 
Cross-Border Water Conflicts in Mesopotamia: An Analysis According to 
International Law, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 245, 255 (2005) 
(noting Turkey’s attempt to analogize oil and water rights and suggesting Turkish 
officials believe the rivers’ waters are the sole property of Turkey); Scott L. 
Cunningham, Comment, Do Brothers Divide Shares Forever? Obstacles to the 
Effective Use of International Law in Euphrates River Basin Water Issues, 21 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 131, 158 (2000) (noting Iraq’s current contention that 
Turkey has violated numerous existing international treaties with respect to water 
law). 
 42. See Hekki, supra note 41 (discussing Turkey’s assertion of the “Harmon 
Doctrine” which the U.S. used in its dealings with Mexico concerning the water of 
the Colorado River). 
 43. See International Water Law Project, Status of the Watercourse Convention 
(Jan. 8, 2008) available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/intldocs/water 
course_status.html (listing signers of the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable 
Uses of International Watercourses). 
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growing populations, limited resources and political turmoil. 
Unfortunately, international law has often reinforced separate and 
competitive theories among states that share the same watercourse. 
The conflicting doctrines that formed the basis of international water 
law give every State a point to argue, but little help in achieving 
common ground. 
It is a fair question to ask, why have so few States supported the 
Framework Convention some eleven years after its opening for 
signature? The Lead Counsel for the International Water Resources 
Association believes that it is due in part to inaccurate perceptions 
and interpretations of the Convention.44 In a recent article he notes 
that both upstream riparians (e.g Turkey and China) and downstream 
riparians (e.g. Egypt and France) believe that the convention favors 
the other party. He also points out another area of confusion, it is 
little understood that upstream riparians can be harmed caused by the 
prior use and the claiming of rights by downstream riparians.45 
Other reasons why the Framework Convention has not been 
adopted is a “total failure to comprehend the basic rules of 
contemporary international water law that have long rejected the 
principle of absolute territorial sovereignty.”46 He argues that it is 
now generally agreed that the “management of international 
watercourses should be determined less by the traditional notion of 
‘restricted sovereignty’ than by a positive spirit of cooperation and 
effective interdependence.”47 
Although he is not a lawyer, Dr. Tony Allan provides insight on 
the question of international law and its impact on water rights in the 
Mddle East and North Africa (MENA) countries.48 He notes that the 
legal principles are largely developed by “water outsiders”49 and the 
indroduction of water policy reform (and water law) has been slow. 
 
 44. Salman M.A. Salman, The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten 
Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Force Proven Difficult? 24 WATER INT’L 1, 9 
(2007). 
 45. Id. at 10. 
 46. Id. at 12. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See generally ALLAN, supra note 10, at 263-308 (discussing International 
Water Law in the Middle East and North Africa). 
 49. See generally id. at 3-40 (providing an overview of the debates between 
water pessimists and optimists, insiders and outsiders). 
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Because water is highly mobile, and monitoring is difficult, any rules 
are difficult to enforce. Moreover, “alien legal principles, evolved in 
alien outsider institutions . . . have little appeal to MENA politicians, 
professionals and communities when they will disrupt exixting 
practice and are not founded on the cultural and religious 
conventions of the region.”50 
Although legal principles are of potential significance in the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin, they have had little impact in the region. The 
current rules are complex and misunderstood, and face tremendous 
obstacles to implementation. Only with the right diplomatic and 
economic incentives can we look to international law to provide a 
roadmap for cooperation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. 
III. WATER NEEDS FOR IRAQ 
The population of Iraq is currently about twenty-eight million 
people, but recent large scale displacement within Iraq, and the 
exodus of refugees, makes accurate data difficult to obtain.51 
Approximately twenty-five percent of the population historically 
depended on irrigated agriculture for their livelihood.52 Agricultural 
products traditionally accounted for a significant proportion of Iraq’s 
exports, but this has been reduced by the recent turmoil. Agriculture 
still uses about ninety percent of Iraq’s average annual water supply, 
and is therefore critical to fresh water development and 
management.53 Salination of a large part of the irrigated land results 
in reduced crop yields and high salinity of the rivers, creating 
 
 50. Id. at 288. 
 51. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: Iraq, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) 
(listing the Iraq population in July 2008 as 28.2 million people, while also 
reporting that about two million people have fled the ongoing conflict in Iraq). 
 52. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Johanns Announces $7.8 Million in 
Extension Funds to Revitalize Iraq’s Agriculture (Sept. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1RD?printable=true&content
idonly=true&contentid=2006/09/0378.xml (announcing U.S.-led programs to 
connect U.S. and Iraqi land-grant institutions to support Iraq’s agricultural sector, 
which is the country’s second largest industry and employs one-fourth of the 
workforce). 
 53. 2008 FAO Report, supra note 4 (reporting that in 1990, Iraq used ninety-
two percent of water withdrawal for agricultural purposes, while more recent 
estimates list this figure at eighty-five percent). 
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problems in the municipal water supply, as well as ecological 
problems, which threaten the restoration potential of marshlands that 
Saddam Hussein had drained while he was in power.54 
Iraq has over 500 major pumping stations meant to distribute 
water to farms and cities that gravity canals cannot reach. These 
pumping stations are currently in disrepair due to years of neglect by 
the previous regime, and the looting and damage that occurred 
immediately following the U.S. led invasion. In the summer of 2003 
the pumping stations were operating at about forty percent 
efficiency.55 By the summer of 2004 there was no improvement; the 
money allocated for repair had not been spent due to contract 
inefficiencies and security concerns.56 In September 2004 it was 
announced that the original amount allocated for improvements to 
water and sewage in Iraq of $4.15 billion, would be cut to $2.21 
billion. This was part of the shift in American priorities in Iraq, and 
recognition of the seriousness of the security situation.57 
The Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources was reorganized and 
staffed in 2003 and 2004 with U.S. assistance. It developed 
ambitious plans for a transboundary water commission in the hopes 
of coordination with Iraq’s upstream neighbors.58 By 2007 there was 
 
 54. NURIT KLIOT, WATER RESOURCES AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 159 
(1994) (naming soil salinity as the greatest obstacle to Iraqi agriculture, and noting 
that as early as 1949, an estimated sixty percent of the land irrigated by flow water 
was seriously affected by salt); see also Press Release, IRIN Humanitarian News 
and Analysis, Iraq: New Dams Threaten Agriculture and Marshland (Nov. 29, 
2006), available at http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=61975 
(reporting that due to Saddam Hussein’s marshland flooding policies, an area that 
in 1970 comprised 3600 square miles of marshlands shrank by ninety percent to 
300 square miles in 2002). 
 55. Eugene Z. Stakhiv, Senior Advisor, Iraq Ministry of Irrigation, Fact Sheet, 
(July 4, 2003) (on file with author). 
 56. Interview with Walled Abdel-Hameed, Planning Coordinator, Iraq Ministry 
of Water Resources, in Baghdad, Iraq (Aug. 1, 2004). 
 57. James Glanz, Iraqis Warn that U.S. Plan to Divert Billions to Security 
Could Cut Off Crucial Services, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at A12 (explaining 
that the dramatic reduction in resources allocated for water and sewage 
improvements resulted from shifting priorities and factors stemming from the 
sociopolitical conflict). 
 58. Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Bremer and 
Iraq’s Minister of Water Resources Announce Major Irrigation Project as Ministry 
Takes Final Steps Toward Sovereignty (May 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org [hereinafter CPA Press Release] (explaining how the 
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little progress in rebuilding Iraq’s water infrastructure, by some 
estimates it will take $15 billion to fully restore Iraq’s water 
system.59 Without a guarantee of a long-term water supply, any 
progress in this sector could be for naught. 
The Iraqi leadership recognized the threat of reduced water supply 
in their Iraqi National Security Strategy for 2007-2010. 
The problem of decreasing water levels in the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers is a dangerous phenomenon that directly 
threatens environmental and nutritional security. It affects the 
climate and wetlands, increases desertification, and even 
decreases the availability of potable water in the middle and 
southern regions. This problem stems essentially from the 
fact that there are large dams in Turkey and Syria for storing 
the water of the two rivers that do not take into consideration 
the rights of Iraq to water resources and the longer stretch of 
these rivers on its territory. Therefore, leaving this problem as 
it is due to the failure of joint committees formed to resolve it 
leaves Iraq subject to a catastrophe that threatens its current 
and future national security.60 
Recognizing the threat as a security issue may be the first step in 
dealing with the problem. However, having the diplomatic and 
economic resources to deal with Turkey and Syria on these issues 
remains a formidable obstacle for Iraq. 
IV. THE KURDISH QUESTION 
The question of Kurdish autonomy and possible independence 
from Iraq has been the subject of much debate, with the sharing of oil 
resources being a central factor in that discussion.61 But the sharing 
 
advances made by the Ministry after its administrative reorganization have helped 
the Ministry gain sovereignty). 
 59. Iraq Needs $15bn to Fix Water Supply, ALJAZEERA NEWS, June 29, 2005 
(reporting that the Water Resources Minister’s estimation of the cost to build and 
repair dams, irrigation canals, sewage systems and purification stations). 
 60. Republic of Iraq Nat’l Sec. Council, IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
16 (July 2007), available at http://www.iraqslogger.com/downloads/NSS_ 
English.pdf (listing Iraq’s ecological interdependence as a threat to the country’s 
stability and laying out strategies to overcome the recognized security threats). 
 61. See Jason Campbell, Michael O’Hanlon & Amy Unikewicz, Op-Ed., The 
State of Iraq: An Update, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at WK13 (setting hypothetical 
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of water resources within Iraq is rarely reported, despite the fact that 
the Kurdish areas in the north control a major part of the flow of the 
Tigris River, as well as major dams. Expanding irrigation and 
agriculture in northern Iraq, or the building of new dams, will further 
complicate the already tenuous water situation in the south. 
The Kurds in northern Iraq have long recognized the importance 
of controlling their own water resources. It is no accident that an 
influential Kurd, Latif Rashid, was appointed to the newly formed 
Ministry of Water Resources in Baghdad soon after the U.S. led 
invasion in 2003.62 The Kurds seem better organized than their Iraqi 
brethren in the south; comparatively good security in the north has 
no doubt been a factor. And the Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG) has an independent water resources management system, 
with its own strategic planning apparatus.63 The Kurds are not 
reluctant to criticize Turkish projects, such as the Ilisu Dam, that are 
likely to impact their own water resources.64 
The Kurds are moving ahead in developing Northern Iraq without 
waiting for stability in the central government in Baghdad.65 On 
March 16, 2008 the KRG Minister of Water Resources received a 
commercial delegation from the United States that included Jay M. 
Garner, a retired U.S. General and former head of the Office of 
 
political goals for Iraq which include holding a referendum on the disputed 
northern oil city of Kirkuk); see also Gary Kent, Iraq’s Kurds Deserve Better 
Neighbors, NEW STATESMAN, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.newstatesman.com/ 
media/2008/02/iraq-turkey-kurds-pkk-syria (explaining that the debate over Kirkuk 
is mainly over oil reserves and the fear that Kurd control of a portion of the oil 
reserves could provide a basis for Kurds to favor independence over the current 
stance favoring autonomy). 
 62. Iraq’s Post-War Cabinet, BBC NEWS, Sept. 1, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3199561.stm (listing all new cabinet 
members to the Ministry of Water Resources by ethnic and religious grouping). 
 63. See NABAZ TAHIR, MINISTRY OF WATER RES., STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 
(2007), available at http://www.mowr-krg.org/PDF/Strategic%20Outlook.PDF 
(outlining the plan for the Ministry of Water Resources to effectively attend to the 
water needs of the Kurdish Region). 
 64. See Press Release, Kurdish Human Rights Project, Reemergence of 
Discredited Ilisu Dam Project: Turkish Dams Violate EU Standards and Human 
Rights (Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://www.khrp.org/news/pr2005/06-04-
05.htm (arguing that besides displacing up to 78,000 mostly Kurdish people, that 
the dam project will also submerge important archeological sites). 
 65. See Ministry of Water Resources, Minister of Water Resources Meet USA 
Delegation, Mar. 16, 2008, http://www.mowr-krg.org/. 
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Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.66 The purpose of the 
meeting was to find a mechanism to involve the private sector in 
reconstruction of the Federal Region of Kurdistan. The outlook for 
Iraq, in terms of a federal system or autonomy for the north, remains 
unresolved at the time of this writing. But the issue of water 
resources between the north and the south will have to be part of the 
final resolution. 
V. THE TURKISH DAMS 
In the 1930s, the father of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk, 
proposed the construction of a series of dams with the idea of 
harnessing the mighty Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The Southeast 
Anatolia Project (“GAP” from Turkish) is the culmination of that 
dream and a source of great national pride.67 The GAP was funded 
without the benefit of international financial organizations or the 
World Bank. International concern about the impact on downstream 
neighbors prevented loans and grants for the Turkish dams. 
The GAP is a large-scale and multi-sector regional development 
project with major implications for the region. It is one of the major 
river basin development projects in the world and the largest and 
most comprehensive project ever carried out in Turkey. The project 
is located in Southeastern Turkey and includes eight provinces 
covering a vast area that includes Turkey’s most desolate and poorest 
regions.68 The GAP is intended to bring industrialization and growth 
to the poorest regions of the country, send electricity to population 
centers and add to the agricultural export base of Turkey. It is also 
designed to provide hope for the large Kurdish minority in the 
region. 
The GAP project area includes nearly half of the total watershed 
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers within Turkey, and when fully 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See generally İ.H. Olcay Ünver & Rajiv K. Gupta, A New Perspective on 
Water Development and Poverty Reduction in Southeastern Anatolia, Turkey, in 
WATER DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION 231, 232 (İ.H. Olcay Ünver et 
al. eds., 2003) (explaining that the Southeast Anatolia Project was developed to 
spur socio-economic development in the “fertile crescent” by abolishing inter-
regional differences through infrastructure investment). 
 68. See id. at 233, 237 (providing a map of the GAP region and describing the 
high infant mortality rate and low average household income). 
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developed it will provide irrigation for 1.7 million hectares (nearly 
four million acres) of land, or twenty percent of the irrigable land in 
Turkey.69 The GAP includes thirteen major irrigation and 
hydropower schemes that involve the construction of twenty-two 
dams and nineteen hydroelectric power plants on the two rivers.70 
The GAP will eventually double Turkey’s 1984 hydroelectric 
capacity, and is expected to generate twenty-seven billion KWH per 
year; a substantial portion of Turkey’s electric power needs.71 
Today hydroelectric production from GAP is estimated to be at 
about ninety-six percent of capacity, but the irrigation infrastructure 
is estimated to be only twenty percent complete, far behind the 
objectives described in the original Master Plan.72 The regional 
economic growth has not matched the predicted development 
indicated in the plan, placing limits on construction of new canals. 
Pessimistic local Turkish newspaper reports have estimated the GAP 
irrigation system could take another thirty years to complete.73 But 
hydropower presents a high priority for Turkey; the immediate 
economic benefit of power generation was a strong motivation to 
keep those aspects of the project on track. 
 
 69. SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT REG’L DEV. ADMIN., LATEST 
SITUATION ON SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT ACTIVITIES OF THE GAP 
ADMINISTRATION 1-2 (2006), available at http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Genel/ 
sdurum.pdf [hereinafter REG’L DEV. ADMIN.] (reporting that although the GAP 
region is only ten percent of the geographical area of Turkey, it possesses twenty 
percent of the irrigatable land). 
 70. Ünver & Gupta, supra note 67, at 240 (explaining the construction needed 
to succeed in developing and sustaining the region). 
 71. Id. at 241; see also REG’L DEV. ADMIN., supra note 69, at 2. 
 72. JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY,THE STUDY ON THE REG’L 
DEV. PLAN FOR THE EASTERN BLACK SEA REGION IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 4-
10 (2000) (illustrating the official GAP Plan in 1989 as published by the GAP 
Regional Development Administration). 
 73. The author lived in Ankara during 2003 and again in 2007and reviewed 
local media. The consensus of published reports seemed to be that the project 
would take at least twenty more years to complete. See also SEMINAR FOR 
DOCTORAL STUDENTS AT THE ETH ZURICH, CASE STUDY: SOUTHEASTERN 
ANATOLIA PROJECT IN TURKEY – GAP 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.eawag.ch/research_e/ apec/Scripts/GAP07feb01.pdf [hereinafter 
SEMINAR] (noting that the deadline for the GAP project has been moved to 2047 
due to financial constraints). 
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Today Turkey maintains that it uses only 25.9 billion cubic meters 
(BCM) of its capacity of 110 BCM of fresh water.74 It claims that the 
remaining 84.1 BCM “is not surplus,” but “cannot yet be allocated to 
its needs.”75 This part of Turkey’s position can be verified in the 
sense that Turkey has been unable to complete its grand plans for 
irrigation infrastructure, and the water behind the dams in Turkey 
remains largely unused for agriculture. Slow progress of the GAP 
irrigation project has indirectly benefited the downstream countries 
by delaying the inevitable impact on water resources. Currently, less 
than twenty percent of the total irrigation diversions have occurred 
and the dams producing hydropower, once filled, will not reduce the 
flow of the rivers.76 But the long term impact of increased irrigation 
in Turkey is a different matter. 
During the author’s time in Ankara in the summer of 2007, water 
was a major topic of concern, but only because of the drought and 
water supply cuts that were affecting everyone in the city.77 A visit to 
the GAP Administration offices in August revealed that the agency 
was focusing more on the social and economic aspects of the project 
than the overall irrigation and consumptive water use.78 The GAP 
Administration has responsibility for coordinating all aspects of the 
project, but lacks the authority to control water infrastructure. In 
 
 74. THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF REG. AND 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS, WATER ISSUES BETWEEN TURKEY, SYRIA, AND IRAQ 2 
(1996), available at http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume1/June-August 
1996/WATERISSUESBETWEENTURKEYSYRIAANDIRAQ.pdf [hereinafter 
WATER ISSUES STUDY] (explaining that the amount of fresh water available to 
Turkey per capita is one-fifth of the amount available in water-rich countries). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See REG’L DEV. ADMIN., supra note 69, at 4 (noting that the project was 
13.7 percent complete at the end of 2005). 
 77. See Water Supply Cuts Create Controversy in Turkey Suffering from 
Drought, THE NEW ANATOLIAN, Aug. 4, 2007, available at http://www.thenew 
anatolian.com/tna-28079.html (reporting water levels in the Konya Basin, 
containing forty percent of Turkey’s groundwater resources, down eighteen meters 
in the past twenty years, and three meters in the past year). 
 78. In previous visits to the GAP project headquarters between 1997 and 2003 
the author was provided a bag full of pamphlets and materials, in English, with the 
positive aspects of the GAP project emphasized. This may have been due in part to 
the proactive work of the previous director, Dr. Olcay Ünver, who left the project 
in 2003 for a teaching position at Kent State University in the United States. He 
has since moved on to lead the UNESCO World Water Assessment Program in 
Paris. 
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Turkey the real authority in terms of dams and irrigation lies with the 
State Hydraulic Works, which is responsible for “the utilization of all 
water resources in Turkey.”79 
In the summer of 2007 the AK (Justice and Development) Party 
won reelection in Turkey, and continued to push ahead with 
modernization policies and movement towards membership in the 
European Union.80 This could have important implications for the 
Euphrates-Tigris Basin, because the E.U. will have a moderating 
impact on Turkish policy, and ultimately require Turkish consistency 
with E.U. environmental standards.81 If the E.U. ultimately rejects 
Turkey, or Turkey decides to move away from the E.U., there may 
be less incentive for Turkey to cooperate on water issues with its 
neighbors to the south. 
The Turkish position on transboundary waters has been consistent 
and open, beginning with the argument that “Turkey is not a country 
with excess water capacity.”82 It states, “[a]lthough Turkey has at 
present more water resources than some of its neighbors, it can be 
regarded as a country which will find itself in a position not to meet 
its own needs in the near future.”83 As mentioned earlier, Turkey has 
consistently maintained that the Euphrates and Tigris constitute “one 
 
 79. TURKISH GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF STATE HYDRAULIC WORKS, MISSION 
AND DUTIES, http://www.dsi.gov.tr/english/about/goreve.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 
2008) (stating a mission to develop water resources for a number of functions, 
including irrigation, hydroelectric power generation, city water supply, recreation, 
and research). 
 80. Turkish PM Vows to Pursue Reform, BBC NEWS, July 23, 2007, available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6911223.stm (announcing the re-election of 
the Islamist-rooted AK-party Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and 
reflecting that his efforts may meet resistance from a secular Turkey). 
 81. See generally EUROPA, OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ACTIVITIES: 
ENVIRONMENT, http://europa.eu/pol/env/print_overview_en.htm (last visited Aug. 
26, 2008) (emphasizing the importance of protecting the environment and using 
alternative sources of energy); TURK. REPUBLIC PRIME MINISTRY 
UNDERSECRETARIAT OF STATE PLANNING ORG., MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS REPORT: TURKEY 52 (2005), http://www.undp.org.tr/publications 
Documents/6161-Turkey_MDG_Report.pdf (explaining the major legal changes 
Turkey is making to conform its environmental policies to those of the United 
Nations). 
 82. See WATER ISSUES STUDY, supra note 74, at 1. 
 83. See id. (explaining that a large portion of the unutilized fresh water in 
Turkey is not surplus but rather water that has not yet been harnessed in a usable 
form). 
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basin,” with the implication that any downstream shortage (in Iraq, 
for example) can be made up by re-allocating water between the Two 
Rivers.84 In Iraq the situation for the Tigris is less severe than for the 
Euphrates, as Iraq draws a portion of its water from Iran through the 
Tigris, but the Euphrates flow is virtually all from Turkey. 
Today in Turkey the GAP project is moving ahead, with virtually 
all of the hydropower units completed. Reports from mid-level water 
officials in Ankara in 2007 indicated that the water is now available 
behind the dams for expanded irrigation in the GAP Region, but that 
the infrastructure is still only twenty percent complete due to 
financing difficulties.85 In an attempt to move the process forward, 
the Prime Minister made a major speech just before the election in 
2007 stating the need for a program of private investment in the GAP 
Region.86 In 2008 world financial difficulties began to have an 
impact on emerging markets like Turkey, presenting another risk to 
infrastructure development.87 Turkish agriculture has still not 
received the amount of water promised more than ten years ago, and 
while this may delay the ultimate impact in Syria and Iraq, it 
certainly will not prevent an eventual water crisis. 
 
 84. See BÜLENT TOPKAYA, WATER RESOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 
FORTHCOMING PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE REGION (1998), http://www.akdeniz.edu.tr/muhfak/publications/gap.html 
#Turkey (presenting Turkey’s proposal for equitable distribution of the river 
waters between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq by moving some of the Tigris’ water to the 
Euphrates in a attempt to between the country’s solutions). 
 85. Interviews with Officials at the GAP Administration and the State 
Hydraulic Works (DSI) (Aug. 2007); see also SEMINAR, supra note 73, at 6 
(estimating only 450 million US dollars were invested in 1999 when there need to 
be closer to 900 million US dollars invested and that the lack of funding has 
caused at least a 15 year delay in construction). 
 86. See Turkish PM Unveils Investment Plan for South East, NTVMSNBC, 
May 27, 2008, available at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/447959.asp 
(proposing funding to come from Turkey’s unemployment insurance fund, public 
and private sector joint projects, and the central budget); Turkish Premier 
Encourages Dutch Investors, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Feb. 28, 2007, 
(discussing a meeting of the Turkish Prime Minister and the Dutch, along with 
Queen Beatrix of Netherlands, in which the Netherlands expressed a desire to 
double the number of Dutch businessmen in Turkey).  
 87. Alexei Barrionuevo, Emerging Markets Find They Aren’t Insulated From 
the Tumult, N.Y. TIMES, Oct./ 7, 2008, at B1. 
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VI. AVERTING A CRISIS 
Although the GAP project in Turkey is behind schedule, the 
downstream impact is already apparent. In Iraq the decline in water 
quality and quantity is complicating the already difficult program of 
reconstruction. Under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was 
uninterested in planning and coordinating water issues with Syria 
and Turkey. Water infrastructure in Iraq went into a steady and 
catastrophic state of decline. The “joint technical committee” on 
water resources between Turkey, Syria and Iraq did not meet 
between 1993 and 1997. In 2004, Turkey provided a limited amount 
of water flow data to the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, 
indicating that confidence-building measures are possible.88 This was 
significant because the parties have long treated flow data as a 
national security secret. 
Even more important than water quantity is the question of water 
quality. As more land is brought into production in Turkey, the 
agricultural return flow will surely reduce the quality of water 
received by the country’s neighbors to the south. The question of 
water quality in the basin is not well documented or understood, in 
part because the parties are generally unwilling to make data 
available to outside review. 
Will there be a water war in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin in the next 
ten to twenty years, when the GAP in Turkey significantly impacts 
the natural flow of the rivers? Rather than a classic shooting war, we 
are more likely to see tensions, exacerbated relations, human 
suffering and localized violence. With additional demands being 
made on the rivers by uncooperative parties, water quantity and 
quality will be a central cause of regional instability, leading to a 
decline in economic and public health conditions. This decline will 
in turn make the region’s peoples more susceptible to 
fundamentalism and extremism, thereby undermining recent security 
gains. 
 
 88. Interview with Waleed Abdel Hammad, Water Ministry of Iraq in 
Baghdad, Iraq (Aug. 1, 2004); see also CPA Press Release, supra note 58 
(providing that Turkey and the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources established a 
weekly exchange of information with important water flow data that has helped the 
Ministry gain sovereignty). 
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In his article “WaterWorld,” Robert Kaplan looks at the potential 
consequences of climate change and rising sea levels in 
Bangladesh.89 He describes how the explosive mix of environmental 
degradation, human misery, and religious extremism is at work to 
destabilize the government. Water shortages can provoke the same 
results, as people find it more difficult to live their daily lives. This 
can in turn cause the people to turn to extremism and violence as 
their only recourse against an unresponsive government. In 2008 
there were disturbing signs of instability based on regional food 
shortages; this could be a prelude to a greater threat when water 
supplies and water quality decline.90 
What, if anything, can be done to avoid these consequences? 
There may now be an historic opportunity for the creation of an 
effective transboundary water initiative for Turkey, Syria and Iraq. 
Despite the current turmoil in Iraq, the parties have demonstrated the 
ability to meet and discuss confidence-building measures that could 
lay the groundwork for further cooperation. In January 2008, there 
were some promising signs that representatives of Turkey, Syria and 
Iraq were meeting to discuss issues of common interest in the water 
sector.91 
A number of working models can provide a basis for regional 
cooperation. The International Joint Commission92 addresses U.S.-
Canadian water issues and the Mekong River Commission93 
 
 89. Robert D. Kaplan, Waterworld, THE ATLANTIC, Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 60. 
 90. Andrew Martin, Mideast Facing Difficult Choice, Crops or Water, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2008 at A1 (quoting Alan R. Richards, a professor of economics 
and environmental studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz: “The 
countries of the region are caught between the hammer of rising food prices and 
the anvil of steadily declining water availability per capita”). 
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coordinates water management efforts in Southeast Asia. Further, 
with international support, the parties should benefit from a 
diplomatic initiative similar to the one making progress in the Nile 
Basin.94 The European Union and the World Bank can be principal 
agents, making it a truly international endeavor. Turkey will 
certianly resist the creation of an agency with anything that 
approaches regulatory powers, but an “initiative” that respects 
sovereignty could have some hope for success. 
Over the past five years U.S. diplomacy has played a minor role 
with respect to water issues in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin.95 During 
the period of U.S. occupation of Iraq there was little or no movement 
on the subject, other than the direct assistance to the Ministry of 
Water Resources previously mentioned. And since the Iraqis have 
regained sovereignty they have been generally too weak and divided 
to assert a clear foreign policy on any subject. But the US 
presidential elections in November 2008 could provide a catalyst for 
change. The Obama administration will hopefully enter the region 
with a renewed sense of purpose, and this could encourage 
movement and cooperation in the Basin. There should be a 
recognition in the United States that some well crafted diplomacy 
could help retain stability during a time of transition in Iraq, and 
promote long term benefits in the water sector. 
We should not ignore a number of important programs that are 
already helping to encourage progress and confidence building 
measures in the Basin. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has 
developed a number of initiatives, including a basin-wide modeling 
 
 
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong 
River Basin as agreed upon by Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam). 
 94. See Nile Basin Initiative, NBI Background, http://www.nilebasin.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=42 (last visited Sept. 
27, 2008) (describing the committee as a partnership developed by the countries of 
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system, at the Hydrologic Engineering Center at Davis, California.96 
Obtaining accurate data, and sharing it with all the Basin countries, 
should help to promote cooperation. Technical assistance of this 
kind, including the training of Iraqi water professionals, can go a 
long way in enabling Iraq to deal effectively with domestic and 
international water issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Declining water supplies, food shortages and financial problems 
have recently combined to threaten stability in many parts of the 
globe. But other events could help provide a window of opportunity 
in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin on water issues. Action should be 
taken now to encourage, with financial backing, the formation of an 
international commission or other initiative for Turkey, Syria and 
Iraq. The United States should take a greater role in sustaining such 
an initiative and promoting basic confidence building measures. 
With the right support, the people of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin can 
begin to move towards cooperation rather than conflict with regard to 
their water resources. And this will ultimately help to preserve the 
fragile gains in Iraq that are so essential to regional stability. 
Obtaining accurate data, and sharing it with all the Basin countries, 
should help to promote cooperation. Technical assistance of this 
kind, including the training of Iraqi water professionals, can go a 
long way in enabling Iraq to deal effectively with domestic and 
international water issues. The World Bank is now supporting the 
work of an Arab Water Academy in Abu Dhabi, United Arab 
Emirates, that will be the regions first water educational institution.97 
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